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Swarna and Baoanan: Unraveling the 
Diplomatic Immunity Defense to Domestic 
Worker Abuse 
 
EMILY F. SIEDELL* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Providing individuals with the opportunity to redress wrongs 
committed against them is arguably one of the core purposes of a 
justice system.1 However, this principle necessarily relies on the 
assumption that the accused party can be brought to court. 
Historically, plaintiffs bringing suits against diplomats have been 
denied this opportunity to redress wrongs by virtue of the diplomatic 
immunity defense. One highly visible area where this is particularly 
true is in the context of human rights and, more specifically, domestic 
worker abuse cases. These cases involve suits brought by domestic 
workers against their diplomat employers seeking overdue 
compensation or damages for mistreatment. However, diplomatic 
privileges, as codified under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, provide diplomats with immunity from civil and criminal 
liability and thus courts have consistently struck down domestic 
workers‟ cases for lack of jurisdiction.2 Yet, two recent cases, 
Swarna v. Al-Awadi and Baoanan v. Baja, indicate that the tide may 
be turning. In dismissing the defendants‟ claims of residual 
diplomatic immunity, the court in these two cases takes the first, 
 
* Editor in Chief, Maryland Journal of International Law 2010–2011; J.D., 
University of Maryland School of Law, May 2011. 
1. LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC 
IMMUNITY 496 (1999).  
2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf; see infra Part II.A. 
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albeit conservative, step toward improved access to justice for 
domestic workers.3 
By parsing details and definitions, Swarna and Baoanan 
hopefully represent the beginning of a trend in which courts strike 
down diplomatic immunity as a defense to domestic worker claims. 
However, in rejecting the diplomatic immunity defense, the court in 
these two cases creates the unintended consequence that the 
condemned behavior of former diplomats is condoned when 
committed by active diplomats. Thus, while these cases may help 
advance the rights of domestic workers, the unintended dichotomy 
they create may also finally force the hand of signatory countries to 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to enact an 
amendment or otherwise come to an agreement in which they limit 
diplomatic immunity for both active and former diplomats. Such an 
amendment would correct the perverse dichotomy and reflect the 
judicial trend articulated in Swarna and Baoanan such that domestic 
workers will have a stronger foundation on which to depend in 
bringing their grievances.  
This article will explore the development and application of 
diplomatic immunity as defined by the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). It will then review prior case law 
regarding claims brought by abused domestic workers against their 
employers, whether active or former diplomats. Finally, the article 
will explore the court‟s reasoning in Swarna and Baoanan and 
analyze the way in which these two cases provide for more equitable 
judicial outcomes, question the underlying purpose of diplomatic 
immunity, and further highlight the need to limit diplomatic 
immunity. 
 
3. Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), reconsideration 
denied, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
and remanded, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010); Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). In Swarna v. Al-Awadi, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit vacated the default judgment entered for the plaintiff by the District Court 
on the grounds that the defendants‟ default “was not willful but instead based on 
mistaken belief.” 622 F.3d at 142–43. However, the Second Circuit upheld the 
substantive merits of the District Court‟s findings, specifically that residual 
immunity did not operate as a defense to Swarna‟s claims. Id. at 140. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.   Development of the Diplomatic Immunity Doctrine and 
Application of the VCDR  
Diplomatic immunity can be traced back as early as ancient 
Greece when envoys were protected from harm by the receiving state 
due to possible reprisal by the sending state and retaliation by the 
gods.4 Necessity formed the basis of diplomatic immunity in that 
immunity allowed for the interaction and development of “rules and 
understanding underlying the practice of international politics.”5 
From the time of antiquity forward, what had previously been 
courtesies bestowed upon envoys evolved into rights and eventually 
into precedent or tradition.6 Defining when and to what degree these 
privileges applied to envoys sent from other nations was regarded as 
an issue for legal determination.7 
Many nations chose to approach the issue of diplomatic 
immunity by codifying the privileges, as was the case with the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,8 which became one of 
the most successful and widely supported conventions.9 The Vienna 
Convention‟s preamble identifies that the purpose of the diplomatic 
immunity privilege “is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as 
representing States . . . .”10 The Convention provides for protection 
for both the premises of the mission (which agents of the receiving 
state may not enter without permission from the head of the mission) 
 
 4. FREY & FREY, supra note 1, at 5–6. “Receiving state” refers to the country 
that is receiving a diplomatic envoy from another country whereas the “sending 
state” is the country sending that envoy. 
 5. Id. at 3 (citation omitted). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2, pmbl., 23 
U.S.T. at 3230, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96. 
 9. J. CRAIG BARKER, THE PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL 62–63 
(2006). The VCDR has received the endorsement of the International Court of 
Justice which “expressed the view that the privileges and immunities of diplomatic 
and consular personnel were part of general international law.” Jonathan Brown, 
Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 37 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 53–54 (1988) (citing United States 
Diplomatic Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31 (May 24)). 
 10. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2, pmbl., 23 U.S.T. 
at 3230, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96. 
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and for individual diplomatic agents for which the Convention 
provides, “ . . . shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form 
of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due 
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on 
his person, freedom or dignity.”11 The Convention goes further to 
note, in Article 31, that diplomatic agents are immune from criminal, 
civil, and administrative jurisdiction with three narrow exceptions: a 
real action involving private property, an action regarding succession 
in which the diplomatic agent acts as a private person, and “an action 
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the 
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official 
functions.”12 The VCDR also establishes the scope of immunity, and 
therefore liability, in other international agreements including the 
Headquarters Agreement governing the relationship between the 
United States and the United Nations.13 
Diplomatic immunity has been asserted in a number of cases to 
prevent liability from attaching to a diplomat‟s crime or otherwise 
illegal behavior. Examples range from a diplomat being immune to 
charges of speeding14 to preventing a court from having jurisdiction 
to undertake child protective proceedings in the case of children 
abused by their diplomat parents.15 Domestic worker cases are 
particularly vulnerable to claims of diplomatic immunity.16 Often the 
cases involve domestic workers hired and brought from their home 
countries to work for diplomats assigned to a particular country based 
on previously agreed upon terms and conditions of employment such 
as salary and vacation time.17 Unfortunately, there are instances in 
 
 11. Id. arts. 22, 29, 23 U.S.T. at 3259, 3262, 500 U.N.T.S. at 101, 103. 
 12. Id. art. 31, 23 U.S.T. at 3240–41, 500 U.N.T.S. at 103. 
 13. Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002). 
 14. Burkhardt v. Page-Sharp, 91 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (New Rochelle City Ct. 
1949). 
 15. In re Terrence K, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988). 
 16. See, e.g., Emily Dugan, Diplomat’s Nanny Lifts Lid on Modern Slavery, 
INDEP., Aug. 9, 2009; Sarah Fitzpatrick, Diplomatic Immunity Leaves Abused 
Workers in the Shadows, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2009, at A4; Petra Follmar, 
Daniela Hödl & Ulrike Mentz-Eickhoff, Female Domestic Workers in the Private 
Households of Diplomats in the Federal Republic of Germany (Sept. 2003), 
http://www.ban-ying.de/downloads/cedaw%20engl.pdf. 
 17. E.g., Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2007); Ahmed, 
2002 WL 1964806, at *1; Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Va. 1995), 
aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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which the employers not only fail to live up to their promises, but 
also engage in behavior that extends into abuse.18  
Like many other cases involving diplomats, cases brought by 
abused domestic workers have often been dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction on account of diplomatic immunity asserted by the 
diplomat being charged, or otherwise have been unsuccessful for the 
domestic worker plaintiffs.19 In some cases, the use of the diplomatic 
immunity defense has been justified on policy grounds.20 For 
example, the court in Ahmed v. Hoque accepted diplomatic immunity 
as a shield against liability in a case brought by a domestic worker 
noting that: “[t]his result is compelled for the reason that „by 
upsetting existing treaty relationships American diplomats abroad 
may well be denied lawful protection of their lives and property to 
which they would otherwise be entitled.‟”21 This argument stems 
from the fact that diplomats are often stationed in areas where due 
process is not recognized, where legal procedures are prejudiced 
against diplomats, or where diplomats are frequently harassed.22  
In addition to jurisdictional issues and policy concerns, some 
cases have focused on whether the diplomats‟ actions fit within the 
“commercial activity” exception of Article 31.23 This exception 
 
 18. E.g., Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 286 (discussing a domestic worker, originally 
from the Philippines, who agreed to work in the United States for diplomats based 
on her understanding that she would receive minimum wage, overtime, and a 
reasonable work schedule. However, during her time working for the diplomats she 
was required to work sixteen hours a day at $0.50 an hour with no overtime. 
Moreover, her passport was confiscated, and she was threatened with deportation, 
arrest, or dismissal if she attempted to leave the house); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 
F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009 WL 
1562811 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 
622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing a domestic worker, originally from India, 
who agreed to come to the United States to work in the home of diplomats based 
upon an agreed salary of $2,000 per month with vacation time. The domestic 
worker was only paid $200 to $300 per month, had her passport confiscated, was 
forbidden to leave the apartment or use the telephone to make calls, was called 
names, and was physically abused and raped). 
 19. E.g., Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 195; Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 292. 
 20. See, e.g., Ahmed, 2002 WL 1964806, at *5 (citing 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. 
Permanent Mission of Republic of Zaire to United Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 296 (2d 
Cir. 1993)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. FREY & FREY, supra note 1. 
 23. See, e.g., Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 192–93; Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 288. 
The commercial activity exception states that a diplomatic agent shall “enjoy 
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reflects a general prohibition on diplomats engaging in trade or 
having a second occupation while simultaneously serving as a 
representative of the sending state.24 However, attempts to apply this 
exception in the context of domestic worker abuse cases have been 
largely unsuccessful.25 For example, in Paredes v. Vila, one of the 
arguments advanced by the plaintiff, a domestic worker who brought 
suit against her former employers for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment, was that the plaintiff‟s employment contract constituted 
a commercial and/or professional activity outside the diplomat‟s 
official functions.26 Citing both to a Fourth Circuit opinion in the case 
of Tabion v. Mufti and to the Statement of Interest filed by the United 
States, the court found that “a contract for domestic services such as 
the one at issue in this case is not itself a „commercial activity‟ within 
the meaning of Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.”27  
Ahmed and Paredes are just two illustrations of the type of 
reception diplomatic immunity-related cases receive in court. 
However, as will be explained below, these types of cases receive 
closer scrutiny and a more fact-intensive analysis when the diplomat 
being charged with the offense is a former rather than an active 
diplomat.28 
 
immunity from . . . civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of . . . 
[a]n action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the 
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.” Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2. 
 24. EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 473 (3d ed. 2008). 
 25. See, e.g., Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 193. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 193 (citing Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1996)). In 
deciding to give weight to the Statement of Interest filed by the United States 
government, the court noted that “the Supreme Court has held that „although not 
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies 
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.‟” Id. 
(citing United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)); see also Sabbithi v. Al 
Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that employing plaintiff as 
a domestic worker did not constitute a commercial activity outside the official 
functions of the defendants). 
 28. See Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that 
Article 39 of the VCDR provides for a more restrictive form of immunity than that 
afforded under Article 31). 
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B.   Former Diplomats: Residual Immunity 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides 
different guidelines for assessing domestic worker claims against 
former diplomats as compared to claims against current or active 
diplomats.29 Article 39 of the VCDR provides that  
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and 
immunities have come to an end, such privileges and 
immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he 
leaves the country . . . . However, with respect to acts 
performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions 
as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to 
subsist.30  
This continued, albeit diminished, immunity is justified, for as Eileen 
Denza, a diplomatic law expert, explains,  
The acts of a diplomatic agent in the exercise of his official 
functions are in law the acts of the sending State. It has 
therefore always been the case that the diplomat cannot at 
any time be sued in respect of such acts since this would be 
indirectly to implead the sending State.31  
The determinative question for deciding whether a diplomat is 
entitled to residual immunity is whether a particular act committed 
against a plaintiff was performed by the diplomat in the exercise of 
his official functions.32 Some cases reflect a broad, policy-based 
approach to this question. For example, in Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, in 
which a domestic worker brought claims against her former 
employers, Kuwaiti diplomats, the court simply concluded that 
because the plaintiff‟s claims did not fit within the commercial 
activity exception, the defendant‟s immunity remained intact under a 
residual immunity analysis.33 However, other case law reflects a 
more nuanced analysis of residual immunity. In assessing when 
diplomatic immunity is applicable, courts have often adhered to the 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2, art. 39, 23 U.S.T. 
at 3245–46, 500 U.N.T.S. at 107–08. 
 31. DENZA, supra note 24, at 439. 
 32. Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
reconsideration denied, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 33. 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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principle that immunity applies to a former diplomat‟s official but not 
private acts.34 As illustrated in De Luca v. United Nations Org., an 
“official act” is one directly related to duties listed under Article 3 of 
the VCDR.35 Specifically, the court in De Luca held that former UN 
officials were entitled to residual diplomatic immunity against the 
plaintiff‟s claims that they had instigated an unlawful tax audit, 
forged pay statements, and had failed to investigate these claims.36 
The court reasoned that the former UN officials‟ actions were based 
on their official duties to implement financial and employment-
related policies and thus were covered by residual immunity.37  
Courts have also found “official act” to include a diplomat‟s 
hiring of an employee to work at the diplomatic mission and, by 
extension, any disputes that arise as a result of that employment.38 In 
Brzak v. United Nations, UN employees brought claims including 
emotional distress and indecent battery against the United Nations 
and UN officials.39 As in the case of De Luca, the Brzak court was 
concerned with whether a particular act fell within a diplomat‟s 
official functions, noting that UN officers are granted immunity from 
claims “relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity 
and falling within their functions.”40 In determining whether a claim 
“related to” acts performed in an officer‟s official capacity, the court 
looked to whether the alleged acts were the result of the exercise of 
official functions rather than being concerned with the nature of the 
acts themselves.41 On this basis, the court held that because the acts 
alleged by the plaintiffs occurred in the workplace, they were acts 
 
 34. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
 35. Id. (citing De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 F. Supp. 531, 534–35 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Article 3 duties under the VCDR include, inter alia, negotiating 
with the government of the receiving state, reporting on developments in the 
receiving state to the sending state, and promoting friendly relations between the 
sending and receiving states. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra 
note 2, art. 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3231–32, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98. 
 36. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (citing De Luca, 841 F. Supp. at 534–35). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 518.  
 39. Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). While 
the Brzak case involves the United Nations and its officials rather than diplomatic 
agents, it is still concerned with the application of Article 39 of the VCDR. Id. at 
317. 
 40. Id. at 319. 
 41. Id. 
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against which the officers were immunized despite the fact that such 
conduct was wrongful and inappropriate.42  
Finally, case law demonstrates that official acts do not include 
“acts that were completely peripheral to the official‟s diplomatic 
duties.”43 In the case of In re Application of Noboa, the court faced 
the issue of whether a former diplomatic agent was immune from 
complying with a subpoena requiring her to produce documents and 
give a deposition.44 The court held residual diplomatic immunity to 
be inapplicable because at the time the defendant was served with the 
subpoena she was on a trip not related to her diplomatic duties.45 
While the facts and context of these cases differ, they 
demonstrate a common theme that runs throughout residual 
diplomatic immunity case law, namely that courts have a tendency to 
uphold diplomatic immunity for defendants except in the most 
egregious of situations.  
C.   Swarna and Baoanan: A Turning Point in Residual Immunity 
Analysis 
1.   Swarna v. Al-Awadi 
Swarna v. Al-Awadi was the first indication that courts might 
begin reigning in the scope of diplomatic immunity. This section 
explores the court‟s reasoning in this case and the way in which it 
came to the conclusion that diplomatic immunity was an insufficient 
defense to a domestic worker‟s claims of abuse.  
In 1995, Vishranthamma Swarna agreed to relocate to the United 
States to work as a domestic worker for Mr. Al-Awadi, who was 
serving as Third Secretary at the Kuwait Mission in New York City, 
and his wife, Ms. Al-Shaitan.46 Swarna was promised $2,000 per 
month, Sundays off, and one month of paid vacation per year to visit 
 
 42. Id. at 320; see also D‟Cruz v. Annan, No. 05 Civ. 8918(DC), 2005 WL 
3527153, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) (holding that plaintiff‟s claims including 
harassment and suspension arose from his employment at the United Nations and 
relate only to acts performed within the official capacity of the defendants as UN 
officials and employees, and thus the defendants were immune from liability). 
 43. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 44. Id. at 518 (citing In re Application of Noboa, M18-302, M19-111(JSM), 
1995 WL 581713, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1995)). 
 45. Id. (citing In re Application of Noboa, 1995 WL 581713, at *4). 
 46. Id. at 512–13. 
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her family in India.47 However, when Swarna arrived in the United 
States, Mr. Al-Awadi confiscated her passport, forced her to work 
approximately seventeen hours a day, seven days a week, and paid 
her only $200-$300 per month.48 Moreover, Swarna was forbidden to 
leave the apartment unless she was supervised (even with 
supervision, Swarna only left the apartment a total of ten to fifteen 
times in four years), was forbidden to use the telephone to make calls, 
and was called derogatory names.49 Swarna was also repeatedly raped 
by Mr. Al-Awadi and physically abused by Mr. Al-Awadi and his 
wife on numerous occasions.50  
Swarna initially filed the lawsuit while Mr. Al-Awadi was still 
serving as a Kuwaiti diplomat.51 Like many of the domestic worker 
cases previously cited, the district court dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction, citing the fact that Mr. Al-Awadi was entitled to 
diplomatic immunity.52 However, the court dismissed the case 
without prejudice because the court noted that Swarna could re-file 
her action against Mr. Al-Awadi when he was no longer serving as a 
Kuwaiti diplomat.53 Swarna accepted the court‟s implicit suggestion 
and once again filed a claim against Mr. Al-Awadi when he had 
completed his diplomatic service.54 The court then assessed Swarna‟s 
labor law and Alien Tort Claims Act claims under the residual 
immunity language of Article 39 of the VCDR.55  
i.  Labor Law Claims 
Swarna alleged labor law claims in the form of failure to pay 
required wages, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract.56 
Applying the principles set forth in prior cases and parsing the 
language of Article 39, the court noted that the protection afforded by 
residual immunity was inapplicable if the acts alleged by Swarna 
could be considered private acts, separate from Mr. Al-Awadi‟s 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 513. 
 49. Id. at 513–14. 
 50. Id. at 514. 
 51. Id. (citing Vishranthamma v. Al-Awadi, No. 02 Civ. 3710(PKL)(MHD) 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2005)). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 514, 516. 
 55. Id. at 512, 516. 
 56. Id. at 512. 
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official duties.57 The court agreed with the defendants that Swarna‟s 
labor law claims could be described as “employment-related” as they 
were based on an employment relationship, similar to the claims in 
Brzak.58 However, the court hedged its agreement by noting, “[i]t 
does not follow that all employment-related acts by a diplomat are 
official acts to which residual immunity attaches once the diplomat‟s 
duties end.”59 In this particular case, the court held that residual 
immunity was unavailable as a defense because Mr. Al-Awadi‟s 
employment of Swarna was a private rather than an official act.60 In 
so holding, the court reasoned that Swarna‟s employment “bore no 
relationship to the „functions of a diplomatic mission‟” as listed under 
Article 3 of the VCDR, that Swarna was not employed as part of 
implementing an official policy of the Kuwait Mission, and that 
Swarna was not hired to work at the Kuwait Mission as a subordinate 
of Mr. Al-Awadi.61 The court went on to note that, even though on 
occasion Swarna had served members of the Kuwait mission when 
Mr. Al-Awadi and his wife entertained at home, “[t]his tangential 
benefit to the Kuwait Mission did not make her an employee of the 
mission, and did not make Mr. Al-Awadi‟s act of employing her „in 
law the act[] of the sending State.‟”62  
ii.   Alien Tort Claims Act Claims (ATCA) 
Under ATCA, Swarna brought claims of “trafficking, 
involuntary servitude, forced labor, assault and sexual abuse.”63 In 
response to these claims, the court noted that if residual immunity 
were held to extend to rape and the other acts cited by Swarna it 
would be “tantamount to holding that Art. 39 extends to all acts taken 
by a diplomatic agent . . . .”64 Moreover, the court found that the acts 
alleged by Swarna were peripheral to Mr. Al-Awadi‟s duties and 
responsibilities as a diplomat in much the same way as the In re 
Application of Noboa case.65 Finally, the court cited the fact that 
“diplomatic agents were only intended to receive residual immunity 
 
 57. Id. at 519. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 520. 
 61. Id. (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. (citing DENZA, supra note 24, at 439). 
 63. Id. at 512. 
 64. Id. at 521. 
 65. Id. 
SIEDELL Article 9/25/2011  2:06 PM 
184          MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 26:173 
with respect to official acts, and that not all acts of a diplomatic agent 
were understood to be official.”66 As with the labor law claims, the 
court held Mr. Al-Awadi‟s actions to have been private, thus once 
again making residual immunity inapplicable.67  
2.   Baoanan v. Baja 
While Swarna v. Al-Awadi laid the groundwork for abused 
domestic workers to have greater access to justice, Baoanan v. Baja 
confirmed and furthered the precedent of striking down diplomatic 
immunity as an absolute defense. This section highlights the key facts 
of the Baoanan case and explores the relationship between Baoanan 
and its predecessor, Swarna.  
As plaintiff Marichu Baoanan relays the story, Mr. and Mrs. 
Baja asked her to travel to the United States from the Philippines by 
making false promises of finding her employment as a nurse upon her 
arrival.68 However, when Baoanan arrived, Mr. Baja, who was 
serving as the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the 
United Nations at the time, forced her to work as a domestic servant 
in their house at the Philippine Mission.69 During her time working 
for Mr. Baja, Baoanan worked approximately 126 hours per week, 
was forced to sleep in the basement, was prevented from leaving the 
household unaccompanied or from using the telephone, and was 
verbally abused.70  
Like Swarna, the court here determined that Mr. Baja‟s claim of 
diplomatic immunity was to be assessed under Article 39 of the 
VCDR regarding residual immunity as opposed to the broader Article 
31.71 In assessing Baoanan‟s claims, the court first rejected Mr. and 
Mrs. Baja‟s blanket argument that they were entitled to diplomatic 
immunity because the act of hiring and bringing domestic help into 
the country was a “long engrained practice.”72 Rather, like Swarna, 
the court here focused on determining whether Baoanan‟s 
employment could be considered an official or private act.73  
 
 66. Id. at 522. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 159. 
 71. Id. at 161. 
 72. Id. at 165. 
 73. Id. 
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The court first looked to the documents used to obtain Baoanan‟s 
visa to enter and work in the United States.74 Specifically, the court 
took note of an affidavit which indicated that should a diplomat 
employ private staff, it would be for personal household needs.75 
From this stipulation the court concluded that “the employment of a 
domestic worker by a diplomatic agent predominately for the purpose 
of meeting his own and his family‟s personal needs is not an act 
performed „in the exercise of his functions as a member of the 
mission.‟”76 Again, as in Swarna, the court emphasized that 
Baoanan‟s work at official Philippine Mission events did not 
“transform her employment into an official act.”77 The court also 
struck down the Bajas‟ assertion that because the family actually 
resided in the Philippine Mission and Baoanan was hired to work in 
the Bajas‟ residence that her employment was for official purposes 
and that any disputes arising from the employment would likewise be 
considered official and subject to diplomatic immunity, as was the 
case in Brzak.78 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that “to 
hold categorically that it is always an official act to employ an 
individual who works within the four walls of a diplomatic 
mission . . . would improperly reward form over substance.”79 The 
court went on to note that “[p]hysical location should be considered 
in determining whether an act is official or private, but certainly it is 
not by itself dispositive.”80 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise 
would: 
[R]esult in a perverse outcome: a diplomatic agent whose 
official residence happens to be located within the same 
building as the mission would be immune from jurisdiction 
for acts stemming from his employment of a domestic 
worker, while a diplomatic agent who resides in a separate 
building adjoining or nearby his mission and employs a 
domestic worker to perform identical duties in an identical 
fashion, would not qualify for immunity.81 
 
 74. Id. at 167–68. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 168. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 168–69. 
 79. Id. at 169. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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The court found that Mr. Baja could not benefit from residual 
immunity and ordered that the Bajas‟ motion to dismiss be denied.82 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.   A Shift in Judicial Thinking: Departing From Prior 
Precedent With an Eye on Equity 
Prior case law reflects a broad definition and application of 
diplomatic immunity. Cases such as De Luca and Brzak illustrate 
courts‟ tendencies to side with diplomat defendants even in cases 
involving residual diplomatic immunity. In contrast, Swarna and 
Baoanan represent a shift in judicial thinking that focuses more on 
achieving a fair and equitable result rather than accepting the 
diplomatic immunity defense as a foregone conclusion. The two 
cases represent an approach where the court appears more willing to 
undertake a critical look at the VCDR language and prior precedent. 
As such, the court provided the plaintiffs with a rare, invaluable 
chance to present the merits of their claims against their diplomatic 
employers to the court. 
 One of the first ways in which we see the court in Swarna and 
Baoanan departing from precedent is in answering the pivotal 
question of whether Swarna and Baoanan‟s employment could be 
termed a private or official act. In answering, the court avoided 
relying on prior precedent holding that employment-related conflicts 
are within the scope of official acts or that location of employment, 
such as inside the mission, invokes a diplomat‟s official functions 
and thus protects him from liability.83 The court further avoided an 
opportunity to ground the holding in prior case law by refusing to 
conclude that even if Baoanan and Swarna‟s employment as domestic 
workers was private, their involvement in official diplomatic events, 
such as entertaining guests of the mission, transformed their 
employment into an official act for which the diplomats could be held 
immune from liability.84  
 
 82. Id. at 170–71. 
 83. See id. at 168–69; cf. Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that “courts have consistently held that employment-
related issues lie at the core of an international organization‟s immunity”). 
 84. Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 168; Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 
509, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 
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A second way we see the court departing from precedent and 
more closely focusing on equitable ramifications is in its failure to 
mention or even consider the policy ramifications of its decisions. 
While in prior cases courts have struck down suits against diplomats 
by highlighting the importance of diplomatic immunity in providing 
safety and security for citizens sent abroad as diplomats, the court in 
Swarna and Baoanan focused more closely on assessing the 
individual facts of the cases at hand rather than assessing whether its 
decisions further diplomacy and international relationships.85  
B.   Swarna and Baoanan Highlight the Tension Between the 
VCDR and the Purpose of the Justice System and Question 
the Underlying Rationale of Diplomatic Immunity 
In choosing an equitable approach over adherence to prior case 
law, the court in Swarna and Baoanan confronted competing 
principles which ultimately forced the court to choose between 
judicial ideals and international political realities. Moreover, the 
results of Swarna and Baoanan currently support a perverse reading 
of case law where diplomats are immune from claims of domestic 
worker abuse when they are employed as active diplomats but may 
be held accountable for those same claims when they are classified as 
former diplomats. While this reading is supported by the VCDR, 
specifically the limited language regarding immunity for former 
diplomats (Article 39) compared to active diplomats (Article 31), 
there arguably does not appear to be any logical connection between 
diplomatic immunity and a diplomat‟s ability to effectively carry out 
his or her duties.86  
One of the first dilemmas which the court in Swarna and 
Baoanan faced was how to achieve an equitable outcome while 
adhering to the VCDR framework. The Swarna court solved this 
conflict by framing its decision to allow the plaintiff to take 
 
2010) (citing Brzak, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 319; De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 
F. Supp. 531, 534–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). 
 85. Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 165–70; Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 520; 
accord Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 292–93 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 
535 (4th Cir. 1996); Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002). 
 86. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Human 
Rights, 40 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 34, 47 (1991); see also René Värk, Personal 
Inviolability and Diplomatic Immunity in Respect of Serious Crimes, 8 JURIDICA 
INT‟L 110, 114 (2003). 
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advantage of the system.87 Specifically, the court dismissed the 
plaintiff‟s original complaint against Mr. Al-Awadi, who at the time 
was actively serving as a diplomat, without prejudice because the 
plaintiff could simply wait until Mr. Al-Awadi and his wife were no 
longer actively employed as diplomats to re-file the claim.88 In doing 
so, the Swarna court implicitly suggested that by waiting until Mr. 
Al-Awadi had left his diplomatic post, the plaintiff would have a 
better chance of succeeding on her claim because of the diminished 
scope of residual immunity.89 However, in so implying, the court 
upheld the very concept it later criticized in Baoanan, namely, 
rewarding form (differences between immunity under Article 31 as 
compared to Article 39) over substance.90 While Swarna and 
Baoanan provided access to justice for domestic workers for whom 
access had previously been nonexistent, the cases arguably 
undermine the legitimacy and purpose of the justice system by only 
allowing domestic workers to present their claims to the court when 
particular circumstances are met rather than when a violation occurs.  
A second tension the Swarna and Baoanan court confronted was 
choosing between undermining the VCDR, which could put their 
country‟s own diplomats at risk, or undermining the judicial 
principles of equity and the right to redress wrongs. When faced with 
the choice, courts have largely chosen to liberally interpret and 
adhere to the VCDR in order to protect American diplomats while 
knowingly turning a blind eye to abuses committed by diplomats.91 
Fear for one‟s own diplomats stems from the concept of reciprocity 
and the idea that a country‟s “representatives abroad are in some 
 
 87. See Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 514. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 91. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002); see also FREY & FREY, supra note 1; see, e.g., 
Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 292–93 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (noting that diplomatic immunity is valuable and necessary “[t]o protect 
United States diplomats from criminal and civil prosecution in foreign lands with 
differing cultural and legal norms as well as fluctuating political climates . . . .”); 
Värk, supra note 86, at 111 (noting that “regardless of the severity of offences, 
states have so far refrained from serious retaliatory actions due to several factors. 
Firstly, states maintain a substantial number of diplomatic agents abroad and they 
do not want to endanger the situation of their diplomats in different and not always 
particularly safe countries”). 
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sense always hostages.”92 It is this fear that “guarantees efficient 
application of diplomatic law and also general obedience” but at the 
same time prevents states from prosecuting diplomats even for acts 
that are arguably not connected to a diplomat‟s efficient performance 
of their job.93 Unlike prior cases, the court in Swarna and Baoanan 
was willing to put the fear aside in favor of allowing for a more 
equitable outcome. While prior case law would lead one to believe 
that the Swarna and Baoanan decisions endanger American 
diplomats abroad, arguably the court‟s approach creates a stronger 
incentive for American diplomats to more closely adhere to Cordell 
Hull‟s supposition that, “the privilege of diplomatic immunity does 
not presuppose the right to violate any laws or regulations . . . of the 
countries to which they are accredited; that on the contrary, the 
privilege of such immunity imposes upon them [diplomats] the 
obligation of observing meticulously such laws and regulations.”94 
While the Swarna and Baoanan opinions highlight the 
importance of achieving equitable outcomes, the decisions also 
provide support for the contention that there is no functional 
connection between immunity from civil and criminal liability and a 
diplomatic agent‟s ability to effectively carry out his or her duties.95 
This is especially true when immunity is provided for human rights 
violations, as in the case of domestic worker abuse.96 For as 
Francisco Orrego Vicuna advocates, “[b]y no standard can such acts 
[human rights violations committed by diplomats] be considered as a 
part of the diplomatic or consular function, and thus neither can be 
considered an official act.”97 Vicuna goes on to argue that “[i]f one 
aspect has been perfectly established in the contemporary law of 
human rights, it is that no State can stand above the requirements of 
protection of such fundamental rights.”98 While prior case law has 
not necessarily embraced this view, Swarna and Baoanan are the first 
indications that courts may be stepping up to accept their role in what 
 
 92. DENZA, supra note 24, at 2. 
 93. Värk, supra note 86, at 111. 
 94. FREY & FREY, supra note 1, at 497. 
 95. Vicuna, supra note 86. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.; see also Värk, supra note 86, at 114 (noting in the context of grave 
crimes, “the theory of functional necessity or, in other words, the very same link 
between diplomatic immunity and necessity to perform diplomatic functions 
effectively renders questionable the necessity or legitimacy of diplomatic immunity 
in such cases”). 
 98. Vicuna, supra note 86, at 47–48. 
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Vicuna considers a new, emerging form of jurisdiction, namely the 
“humanitarian jurisdiction.”99 
C.    The Need For Change in the Realm of Diplomatic Immunity 
The Swarna and Baoanan opinions provide support for 
amending the scope and nature of diplomatic immunity under the 
Vienna Convention. One logical possibility that would allow 
domestic workers to seek compensation for harms perpetrated against 
them by diplomats would be to enact domestic laws that would 
impose conditions on countries wishing to send diplomats to that 
country.100 As the ACLU advocated in their testimony to Congress 
regarding the reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act, Congress should require states, “as a condition for their 
diplomats to obtain special visas for their domestic workers, to waive 
their diplomats‟ immunity for civil claims arising from a breach of 
the employment contract.”101 However, it is necessary to remember 
in this context that any diplomatic protection that is denied diplomats 
of one nation is likely to be reciprocated in that “failure to accord 
privileges or immunities to diplomatic missions or to their members 
is immediately apparent and is likely to be met by appropriate 
countermeasures.”102 Thus, adopting ACLU‟s position would require 
countries to make the same difficult choice faced by the court in 
Swarna and Baoanan, namely choosing between allowing victims of 
crimes committed by diplomats to bring claims against the diplomats 
and protecting diplomats from being held responsible for the foreign 
laws of the country in which they are stationed. 
Other suggestions for change include requiring diplomatic 
missions to carry insurance103 and establishing a fund which can be 
used to compensate individuals who suffer abuse at the hands of 
 
 99. Id. at 45. 
 100. Eradicating Slavery: Preventing the Abuse, Exploitation and Trafficking of 
Domestic Workers by Foreign Diplomats and Ensuring Diplomat Accountability: 
Hearing on International Trafficking in Persons: Taking Action to Eliminate 
Modern Day Slavery Before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) 
(statement of Caroline Frederickson, Director, Washington Legislative Office, 
American Civil Liberties Union). 
 101. Id. 
 102. DENZA, supra note 24, at 2. 
 103. Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1517–18 (1986). 
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diplomats.104 The insurance solution would operate by requiring 
countries sending diplomats abroad to purchase insurance for their 
diplomats from a group of private insurers.105 This solution would 
provide a fallback option where abuse victims would be able to 
pursue a claim against the insurer if the claim against the diplomat 
was unsuccessful.106 While both the fund and insurance option would 
allow for more equitable outcomes and thus prevent abuse victims 
from being left empty-handed, neither option has been successfully 
implemented.107 This is arguably a result of cost and reciprocity 
concerns in that if a country, such as the United States, required 
insurance of other nations sending their diplomats to the United 
States, it would likely be required of the United States when it sends 
diplomats abroad.108  
Another possibility is for countries party to the Vienna 
Convention to construct a list of agreed upon crimes for which 
diplomatic immunity is waived and the diplomat may be 
prosecuted.109 In his article, René Värk advocates this solution and 
suggests using the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
as a starting place for constructing a list of universally recognized 
crimes for which signatory countries to the Vienna Convention could 
agree diplomatic immunity would not apply.110  
While it is unclear which of the many proposed solutions would 
be the most successful in providing abused domestic workers access 
to justice, it is clear that action of some sort needs to be taken as 
reports of abused domestic workers do not appear to be 
diminishing.111 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The decisions in Swarna and Baoanan are early indications of 
success in prosecuting diplomats who abuse their domestic workers. 
While their holdings are arguably narrow, Swarna and Baoanan 
 
 104. Michael B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and 
Immunity, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‟L L. REV. 475, 491 (1997). 
 105. Id. at 492. 
 106. Id. at 492–93. 
 107. Id. at 493; Farhangi, supra note 103, at 1517. 
 108. McDonough, supra note 104, at 493. 
 109. Värk, supra note 86, at 114. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See sources cited supra note 16.  
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represent a shift from prior decisions adhering strictly to the language 
of and the policy purposes behind the Vienna Convention to a 
judicial framework with a more equitable focus. However, the 
decisions also create a contradictory result in which diplomats are 
shielded from immunity for cases of domestic worker abuse when 
acting as active diplomats but can be held accountable for the same 
behavior when the diplomats are only protected under residual 
immunity. There are no coherent justifications for this disparity or 
plausible arguments to support the assertion that being shielded from 
such liability allows a diplomat to more efficiently carry out his or 
her functions.  
While the dichotomy created by the Swarna and Baoanan 
decisions does at least provide for a real possibility that an abused 
domestic worker may recover from a diplomat, where prior precedent 
largely did not provide for such an opportunity, plaintiffs are still 
denied forthright access to justice. This is due to the fact that an 
abused domestic worker, in order to have any chance for recovery in 
court, must wait until the diplomat is no longer working in his or her 
diplomatic capacity. Thus, while Swarna and Baoanan represent a 
crucial first step, they are just the beginning of what will hopefully be 
a legal overhaul of diplomatic law. In the meantime, Swarna and 
Baoanan further support current criticisms of the broad diplomatic 
protections afforded by the Vienna Convention. More specifically, 
these cases present new justification for the need for an amendment 
or other change that would hold diplomats accountable for their 
abusive behavior. In this way, these two cases have the potential to 
enact widespread change in the realm of international law. 
 
